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AFTER THE NEBBIA CASE: THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF PRICE REGULATION
FRANK E. HORACK, JR.
Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University
JULIUS COHEN
Of West Virginia University College of Law
Long prior to the stock market fiasco of 1929, the
''embattled farmers" had by successive volleys directed
nation-wide attention to their economic difficulties.
Mortgages assumed on the basis of two dollar wheat
and dollar corn had to be paid from crops commanding
less than half their former prices. In an endeavor to
meet these obligations and the steadily increasing tax
rate, farmers turned to marginal activities. Poultry and
dairy products became the chief source of revenue for
many farmers. Naturally, these marginal activities were
soon over-developed. Price deflation followed, leaving
farm populations devoid of buying power. Demonstra-
tions of the dairy farmers of New York, Wisconsin, and
Iowa during the summers of 1932 and 1933 again em-
phasized that all was not quiet on the farm frontier.
A host of experimental legislation was rushed through
sympathetic legislatures. Most of this legislation was
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patently unconstitutional. Some were ready to declare
that that was unimportant.
During the tide of this legislation activity a milk con-
trol bill was enacted by the state of New York creat-
ing a milk control board and granting to it broad
powers to regulate wholesale and retail prices.' With
the federal government experimenting with the control
of business, it was readily assumed that a new era of
control in the milk industry had arrived. Thus it was
with much anticipation that lawyers and economists
watched the progress of Nebbia v. New York2 from its
first trial till its final appeal and consideration by the
Supreme Court of the United States.' Indeed, the crys-
tallization of regulation and litigation in and around
the Nebbia case has obscured the fact that the regulation
and control of milk production is, in America, at least
a century old. And so, although new manifestations
have been accentuated by the demands of the depres-
sion, the problem itself is neither new or unique. The
problem of milk control is not the problem of relief of
economic distress, except insofar as that relief is neces-
sary to the stability of the milk industry itself. Early
milk control measures arose from the necessity of insur-
ing the maintenance of a safe, adequate, and continuous
supply of milk to the consumers at all times. While it
IN. Y. Laws (1933) Ch. 158.
254 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934), aff. People v. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694
(1933).3The legal periodical literature discussing this opinion has been voluminous.
See, Duane, Nebbia v. People: A Milestone, 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 619 (1934)
Hale. The Constitution and the Price System, 34 COL. L. REV. 401 (1934)
Hardman, Public Utilities. I. The Quest for a Concept-Another Word, 40
W. VA. L. Q. 230 (1934) ; Snellings, Liquidation of the Public Utility Concept,
8 TUL. L. REv. 442 (1934) ; Comments: 47 HARV. L. REv. 130 (1933) ; 32
MICH. L. REv. 832 (1934); 7 So. CAL. L. REv. 325 (1934); 40 W. VA. L. Q.
247 (1934).
AFTER THE NEBBIA CASE
is of course'difficult to single out any particular com-
modity as meriting specialized treatment, the difficulty
of providing fresh pure milk to a large urban population
distinguishes the business from many other commodity
industries. Thus, the milk industry was at first regu-
lated for the purpose of protecting the social interest in
the individual health of the people. Governmental
activity to reach this goal becomes super-imposed upon
the industry only at that point where self-interest
fails to give adequate protection to the public. This
social policy together with the protection of economic
structure may be enforced by penal legislation impos-
ing fine and imprisonment for the commission of cer-
tain prohibited acts; by injunctive relief; by adminis-
trative regulation to insure health standards, of the
product, of the herds, of the distributors; and finally by
the regulation of price. No matter how varied the regu-
lation, if it bears a reasonably effective relation to the
primary object of legislative policy, eventually it will
receive judicial approval.
The problem of adjusting government regulation to
society cannot be evaluated in terms of individual decis-
ions, statutes, or litigation.! The decision in an indi-
vidual case may to some degree enhance or retard the
development of a particular social policy, but for the
most part judicial decision is only a poorly recorded
manifestation of the policy. The true problem of social
control is the determination. of the vital fact or essen-
tial objective of regulation and the formulation of that
4
"Sufficient stress has never been laid on the fact that the significance of
law in daily life of a people depends far more on the persons charged with its
administration than on the principles according to which it is administered."
Ehrlich, Freedom of Decision, 9 MoD. L9G. PHIL. S R. 48 (1917). Cf. Holds-
worth, Case Law, 50 L. Q. REv. 180 (1934).
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objective according to the attitude of mind, the mode
of thinking that expresses the existing mores.
A persistent and effective demand for regulation
seldom arises unless there is a general belief in the need
for regulation. And whatever may be the life of the
statute on the books, enforcement continues only so
long as regulation is adjusted to industry and industry
to regulation. This administration cannot go too fast.
Business cannot reform itself overnight. Nor is this
desirable-for the very continuity of long established
businesses attest the merit of their organization. Thus
regulation, whether it be legislative, administrative, or
judicial, must be a practical regulation which merits
acceptance because of the results that it produces.5
EARLY REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY
Government interference or regulation affixes itself
to an industry at that point where industry fails or
refuses to conduct its affairs in a fashion which will
protect the individual and social interests which a dom-
inant minority of society thinks desirable. In the milk
industry the first demands for government regulation
were for the protection of health.' In this country, as
early as 1784, Massachusetts sought to prohibit the sale
of "diseased, corrupted, and unwholesome products."'
The policy .set forth in this statute was clear; but the
statute was ineffective for the uncertainty of the stand-
ard of "wholesomeness" made administration and en-
5Green, Judge and Jury, (1930) pp. 77 et seq. reprinted from 28 COL. L. Rgv.
1014 (1928).
O1n Europe, regulations to protect the purety of milk are of great antiquity,
-as early as 1599 in Vienna, 1743 in Paris. See ERDMAN, THE MARKETING
OF WHOLE MILK (1921), p. 16.
7Mass. Laws 1784, C. 50.
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forcement almost impossible. Indeed, every case was
a "border-line" case and this administrative barrier
made the statute unworkable.8 As a result of this ex-
perience, legislation was directed toward the regulation
of particular food industries! In dealing with the milk
industry, most states having set forth the general policy
of health protection, have been content either to dele-
gate the problem of determining standards of compli-
ance to an administrative board, ° or to declare by
8Green, op. cit supra note 5 at p. 95. "Duties must await the court's finding
a workable method by which they can be given meaning."
9The Pennsylvania statutes are illustrative of the development of standards
of milk purity. See Pa. Laws (1869) Chapter 56, which provides in general
terms "that the councils of city and boroughs . .. are hereby authorized and
empowered to provide for the inspection of milk, under such rules and regula-
tions as will protect the people from adulteration and dilution of the same."
Greater particularization was provided by the Acts of 1878, Chapter 183,
extending regulation to all persons engaged in the sale of milk and making it
a misdemeanor for anyone to sell "any impure, adulterated, or unwholesome
milk." Further clarity was obtained by declaring "that the addition of water
or ice to milk is hereby declared adulteration; and any milk obtained from
animals fed on distillery waste or any substance in the state of putrefaction
is hereby declared to he impure and unwholesome."
By the Law of 1885, Chapter 186, the test had been extended to include
milk to which water or any foreign substance had been added and impure
milk was described to include milk from sick or diseased cows. An exact and
.Scientific standard was fixed by the statute. Milk which failed "to contain
more than eighty-seven and fifty hundredths per centum of watery fluid and
which contained less than twelve and fifty hundredths per c entum of milk solids
and less fat than three percent and if the specific gravity at sixty degrees
fahrenheit is not between one and twenty-nine one thousandths to one and
thirty-three one thousandths it shall be deemed to be adulterated."
By Act No. 236, Laws of 1895, the inclusion of certain acids Was made an
adulteration and by Act No. 59, the Laws of 1901, the enumeration of specific
acids was increased. These later statutes seem both unnecessary amd unde-
sirable in view of the Act of 1885. Cf. Mass. Law 1859, c. 206; Va. Acts
1847-8, c. 112.
1 For typical control of food purity, see Georgia Code (1926) sec. 2115,
which provides that "it shall be the duty of the commissioner of Agriculture
and the State Chemist to fix standards of purity for food products, where the
same are not fixed by this chapter, in accordance with those promulgated by
the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Treasury, and the Secretary of
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statute exact standards as fast as scientific research can
provide them."1 The general policy has not varied from
the beginning but the standards of compliance have
moved from the general to the specific. 2 Not until the
Babcock test was developed was the administrative
problem of "What is an adulteration?" finally settled. 3
Likewise, rapid developments in the science of bacteri-
ology have provided an effective control over the purity
of milk.A more detailed inquiry into the mechanics of milk
regulation is beyond the purview of this paper. It is
enough to note that once assured of a reasonably clean
and pure product, regulation swiftly moved toward the
regulation of persons engaged in the industry," of pro-
duction conditions," and of methods and conditions of
storage and distribution." And with the development
of greater technical knowledge concerning bovine di-
Commerce and Labor of the United States when such standards have been
published; and when not yet published, the commissioner of Agriculture and
the State Chemist shall fix such standards . .."
As early as 1882, Connecticut by Laws 1882, c. 145, provided that "the
usual tests for quality and the certificate of analysis of the Connecticut Agri-
cultural Station shall be deemed prima facie proof of adulteration."
"Supra note 9. Cf. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREM-
ACY OF THE LAW (1927) p. 30.
2Su pra note 9.
13Strictly speaking, the Babcock test is devised for the determination of the
butter content of milk and not for the purpose of adulteration-; but it is a
simple and effective administrative device to reverse the process and declare
that milk that does not contain a certain per centum of butter fat is adulter-
ated.
See also the statutory recognition of the science of bacteriology. Conn.
Gen. Stat., See. 2482: "Milk containing more than one million bacteria per
cubic centimeter shall be considered impure milk."
14See, for example, Ohio Gen. Code, §4460.
'
3 See, for example, N. J. Laws 1904, p. 224; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) c. 128,
§§2487; 2504.
'
1 R. L. Gen Laws (1909) c. 17:3, §§17-19; N. Y. Cois. Law (McKinney,
1916) Agriculture Law, §§4'5-47.
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seases, legislation was generally adopted providing for
the regulation and inspection of herds" and the estab-
lishment of "accredited areas" for the eradication of
bovine tuberculosis."
This cursory reference to the regulation and enforce-
ment of health standards is meant primarily to indicate
the minutia of regulation that exists in the industry; to
emphasize the burden that this regulation imposes upon
the industry and the attendant increase in the cost of
production; and finally to suggest that the regulation
-cost-price relationship has had constitutional sanc-
tion in the industry for many years."
The history of the legislative, judicial, and adminis-
trative activity in the health regulation of the milk
industry, indicates that the administrative ingenuity of
boards and commissions has done more to shape the
usefulness and effectiveness of the general social policy
than has legislation or judicial decision. Indeed, even
administration advances only as fast as science develops
easy methods of compliance and effective methods of
enforcement. Illustrative, is the experience of highway
regulation, where the painting of a line down the center
of the road (which of course was impossible prior to
hardsurfacing) has done more to keep mototists on
the correct side of the road than all of the penal pro-
visions ever spread upon the statute books.
Does the history of health regulation offer a guide
17See, R. I. Gen Laws 1909, c. 1i5, §3; N. Y. Cons. Laws (MeKinney,
1916), Agriculture Law, §64-a.
"
8 Note, Eradication of Bovine Tuberculosil, 15 IOWA L. Ri:\'. ,r0i. Cf. N. Y.
Cons. Laws, c. 69, §76; Ohio Gen. Code (1926), §1121; Minn. Laws (1923),
c. 269.
t
"This regulation, except in special fields,. consisted, for the most part, in
regulations which effected price only indirectly. See, infra nn. 23-28; Rott-
schaefer, infra n. 30.
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for the future of price regulation? Will the success of
governmental regulation of price standards depend
upon the orderly development of administrative devices
for the accurate and fair determination of price rela-
tionships? These questions of course presuppose a leg-
islative policy judgment that the general social welfare
will be advanced by additional regulation of the indus-
try. This regulation must include an adjustment of
producer - distributor, distributor - consumer, and pro-
ducer-consumer relation. These postulated policy-goals
seek to protect the consumer against the health hazards
created by the producer and the distributor; to insure
the consumer continuity of supply; to protect the con-
sumer against unfair price standards; to protect the
producer against unfair cost-price burdens; to encour-
age organized production units; to control distributor
cost standards; to insure protection against destructive
distributor competition; and finally to insure to the con-
sumer and his community certainty of supply at fair
prices, and to the producer and his community certainty
of market at profitable prices. Obviously, these and the
many other desired results of milk-price regulation can-
not be accomplished by the enunciation of a broad social
policy. Nor can they be accomplished by the succes-
sive tragedies of litigation. If they can be accomplished
at all they must be achieved through the slow, under-
standing science of administration. Administration
cannot be effective until it devises certain and objective
standards of enforcement. Coordinately, these stand-
ards are seldom formulated until there is a dominate
need for protection which the industry is unable or un-
willing to provide; which society is unable to provide
for itself; and which it insists that government provide. -
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: PRICE REGULATION
The economic complexities of our social order where-
in life depends upon the consumption of goods produced
by others is reflected in the ever increasing importance
of price and price-relationships. It is price which for
the most part draws the social lines. Thus the regula-
tion of price becomes at least economically the most
important of the social regulations. Social policy may
dictate that price regulation must depend upon natural
causes20 or it may permit limited and indirect govern-
mental regulation, or it may sanction direct govern-
mental price fixing." We have struggled for several
decades under the assumption that our social policy gave
effect to the first type of price regulation-a sort of
natural law of economics whereby competition provided
both remedies and safeguards to consumer and producer
alike. We have overlooked the fact that governmental
price regulation has always existed in some form. Tax-
ation, the most arbitrary power of government, is a
form of price regulation. Inasmuch as the tax burden
may not always be "passed on" it may in some instances
be a very direct type of price control. In the same
fashion governmental regulations for the insurance of
health standards, 3 the establishment of trade practices,"
the control of unfair competition," minimum hours of
20The Adam Smith approach.
"See infra nn. 23-28.
22As in the case of carriers and utilities.
2See infra nn. 104, 80.
24 See Isaacs and Tauesch, The NRA in the Book and in Busin'ss. 47 HARV.
L. REV. 458 (1934).
"5Rottschaefer, infra n. 30.
"Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum-Wage Legislatiut. 37 llAkv. 1,. REv.
545 (1924).
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labor,26 workmen's compensation," and railway rate dif-
ferentials 8 all impose a burden and a price regulation.
Note, however, that the regulation in these instances
does not constrain the individual choice of price except
as it operates to make too low a choice economically
destructive. The object of these controls is the pro-
motion of some accepted standard of social or economic
good-the protection of health and safety; the preserva-
tion of competition; the equality of purchasing and bar-
gaining power-in general, the assumed economic
stability of the social order. Likewise, these may be
the ends of direct price regulation or price fixing. If
these ends are not assumed then it is quite clear that
the legislature has no claim to judicial support.9 The
patience and the eyes of my readers shall be spared
from a reconsideration of the historic proofs of com-
mon law authority for direct price regulation. Prior
juristic comment"0 has well established that price regu-
lation was an established form of social control during
the middle centuries of English common law develop-
ment. Indeed, price regulation was accepted as the
inevitable result of state authority and was welcomed
2
'Rottschaefer, infra n. 30.
28Mansfield, The Hoeh-Smith Resolution and the Consideration of Com-
inercial Conditions in Rate-Fixing, 16 CORN. L. Q. 339 (1931) ; Arnold, The
Lake Cargo Rate Case of February, 1928, 34 W. VA. L. Q. 272 (1928).
2 9"A regulation for one kind of business may, of course, be invalid for
another; since the reasonableness of every regulation is dependent upon the
relevant facts ...The limitation is that set by the due process clause, which,
as c6nstrued, requires that the regulation shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious; and that the means of regulation selected shall have a real or
substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained." Brandeis, dissent-
ing, New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U. S. 262, 302, 52 Sup. Ct. 371 (1932).
3°Hamilton, Affectation with a Public Interest, 39 YA. E L. J. 1089 (1930),
Rottschaefer, The Field of Governmental Price Control, 35 YALV L. J. 438
(1926) ; McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected zc'th a Public Interest,
43 HARV. L. REv. 759 (1931).
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as a protection from the vicissitudes of trade. With a
general philosophical value which idealized individual
freedom and abhorred state authority, government price
regulation hibernated and was for a time forgotten to
the common law, save in the "exceptional cases of inns,
cabs and gristmills." The long view of price regulation
-the backward view-now sees price regulation as a
problem not of competence but of emphasis. The weary
path of due process from Munn v. Illinois has been so
frequently trod and the reader's eye so frequently di-
rected to the mileposts now visible only after the course
has been run it seems both unnecessary and undesirable
once again to "hit the sawdust trail."
It must suffice to say that the early dogma of price
regulation was couched in language which made the
test of price regulation dependent upon (1) a grant of
a public franchise, (2) the exceptional character of cer-
tain occupations, or (3) a "business affected with a
public interest." The difficult and therefore important
cases all arose under the third classification and it be-
came incumbent upon the court to determine what was
clothed with "a public interest." The test of that qual-
ity, according to Mr. Chief Justice Taft, "was the indis-
pensable nature of the service and the exorbitant charges
and arbitrary control to which the public might be sub-
jected without regulation."' " But this test left an open
field for judicial inclusion and exclusion. And so the
litigious history of the next ten years is marked by
sharp conflicts as to what is indispensable, and indeed
if any service is so indispensable as to justify price
regulation. 2 The judicial literature is full of discussions
lWolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 262 U. S. 522. 538, 4'U Sup.
Ct. 63 (1923).
2The periodical literature is effective in illuminating the conllict. Finkelstein,
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of the merits and demerits of the "affectation test."
Obviously, the test is of course nothing more than a
fiction. To quote from Mr. Justice Stone's dissent in
the Tyson case:
"The phrase 'business affected with a public interest'
seems to me to be too vague and illusory to carry us
very far on the way to a solution. It tends in use to
become only a convenient expression for describing
those businesses, regulation of which has been permitted
in the past. To say that only those businesses affected
with a public interest may be regulated is but another
way of stating that all those businesses which may be
regulated are affected with a public interest. It is dif-
ficult to use the phrase free of its connotation of legal
consequences and hence when used as a basis of judicial
decision, to avoid begging the question to be decided." 3
It should not be overlooked, however, that the vague-
ness and emptiness of the test would have made it use-
ful as a tool to reach the end of governmental regula-
tion had a majority of the court wished to use it for
this purpose. It is rejected now only because the restric-
tive interpretation originally given is no longer accept-
able to a majority of the court. Thus, the Nebbia case8'
now purports to adopt the test set forth by Mr. Justice
Brandies in his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Leibman,
"that the state's power extends to every regulation of
any business reasonably required and appropriated for
the public protection. '35 We have no assurance that a
From Munn v. Illinois to Tyson v. Banton, 27 COL. L. R.v. 769 (1927) ; Rob-
inson, The Public Utility Concept in American Law, 41 HARV. L. REV. 277
(1925) ; Hardman, Public Utilities. I. The Quest for a Concept, 37 W. VA.
L. Q. 250 (1931); See also supra note 30.
3Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927).
34Supra note 2.
31285 U. S. 262, 302, 53 Sup. Ct. 37 (1931).
AFTER THE NEBBIA CASE
more exact or useful test has been advanced. The court
has at least simplified the process by removing one ele-
ment of variation-that is, it may now look to the rea-
sonableness of the regulation and does not have to filter
reasonability through the judicial screens already
clogged with the remains of Wolff Packing Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission 6 the Adkins case," the Tyson case, 8 and
many others."
The decision in the Nebbia case is in itself narrow. It
only sustains the conviction of Nebbia for violating the
regulation established by the milk control board of the
city of Rochester. It does not stand for the proposition
that every price regulation will be supported, but rather
that the policy of price regulation is not abhorrent to
the Constitution. And of course it must always be
remembered that the only reference made by the Con-
stitution is that vague, and without interpretation,
meaningless phrase, that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law."
In the field of constitutional law, and particularly in
the consideration of due process problems, we have
struggled with various innocuous phrases in order, as
Mr. Justice Holmes says, "to beautify what is disagree-
able to the sufferers."4  Cleared of all verbiage the
court's decisions may stand only for a general belief
that "so far as the requirement of due process is con-
cerned . . .a state is free to adopt whatever economic
36Supra note 31.
37261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1922).
38Supra note 33.
'"Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545 (1921) Williams v.
Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct. 115 (1929) ; New Stalc. Ice Co. v.
Liebman, supra 35.
40Su pra note 33 at 446.
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policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public
Welfare and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted
to its purposes.' But this test is even more general
than the rest. And "A theory of price control that
tests its validity by reference to a social ideal runs the
risk of being so vague as to be practically worthless.
The conception of a social ideal is too complex to be
simply stated."" In the end, we must look to what
courts do and not to what they say.'
3
Will the development of price fixing regulation par-
allel the development of rate regulation ? If the Nebbia
case expresses the policy of the court, then the future
will see judicial inquiry directed toward the "reasonable-
ness of price" and not toward the initial competency
to regulate. This will leave to t-he legislature (for the
most part) the problem of policy and leave to highly
trained and technically informed boards the problem of
administration. The jurisdiction of the court will be
for the protection of individual and social interests
against abuse of arbitrary and unreasonable adminis-
tration. The court has frequently limited the character
of its review in this fashion. After Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.," the constitutionality of zoning was established
and the only review that was necessary was a review
to insure a reasonable application of the policy by
administrative order."5 In a similar fashion, the court
41Nebbia v. New York, supra note 2. at 516.
12 Rottschaefer, supra note 30, at 456.
4
:Green, supra note 5.
4272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114 (1926).
4tNectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, 48 Sup. Ct. 447 (1928) Washington
e.r rel. v. Roberge. With policy determined it is inevitable that its adminis-
trative application may not always be "fair and equitable." The determination
of these questions will necessarily require a court (and if appealed sufficiently,
the United States Supreme Court) to pass upon the constitutionality of the
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has directed its attention in the field of utilities to the
reasonableness of rates-the authority to fix them al-
ready having the decisional sanction of the common
law. Thus it would seem that the real point of growth,
at least in price-regulation in the milk industry, will
come through the development of scientific administra-
tive techniques for the determination of price. Today,
there is less judicial confidence in broad declarations of
policy; greater faith in the pragmatic processes of
scientific method.
The sudden growth of administrative tribunals, mir-
rors not only the inability of legislatures to deal with
the intricate problems of business administration, but
also of a judicial confidence in the trustworthiness of
administrative boards. Legislatures, operating without
the benefit of specialized training or experience," and
under the pressure of time and political influence, are
seldom able to do more than devise a fair statement of
general policy. Furthermore, statutes and statutory
standards lack the flexibility necessary to meet the
vicissitudes of price and price determinates. And their
very generality, without administrative interpretation,
would seem-to raise doubts concerning their constitu-
tionality, for it was pointed out in United States v. Addy-
ston Pipe Co.,4' that
regulation. Powell, however, quaery's "What person in his senses would
think of planning a governmental scheme for a continent under which nine
men at the national capitol should decide whether a zoning boundary should
be extended another one hundred feet before it turns a corner?" The Supreme
Court and State Police Power, 18 VA. L. REv. 1, at 33 (1931).
16The appointment of special committees, the holding of hearings, the pre-
servation of reports tend for a particular session to overcome the paucity of
scientific experience. Unfortunately, after a two year adjornment the col-
lected material is out-moded, the legislative personnel changed, 'and the prior
experience forgotten.
47175 U. S. 211, 20 Sup. Ct. 96 (1899).
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"The manifest danger in the administration of jus-
tice according to the shifting, vague, and indeterminate
a standard would seem to be a strong reason against
adopting it."
Only administrative investigation can provide the exact
standards which the court desires." The method of
administrative tribunals, at once empirical and scientific,
will most nearly afford an answer to the question of
"fair price."
ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION OF FAIR PRICE
In many states, the creation of milk control boards"9
has filled the important gap between legislative sanction
and judicial approval. Statutes have empowered these
boards to act, not only as passive fact-finding bodies,
but also to participate actively in the declaration of
regulatory standards. The administrative regulation,
unlike the statute, has the advantage of flexibility and
experience, so unless it goes too far beyond the "funda-
mental tenets of the judiciary," it will operate as law.
A majority of the problems of organization, charges,
and practices in the milk industry are within the ambit
of administrative authority. Most boards are author-
ized to prescribe minimum and maximum prices and to
regulate and to control the distribution, sale, and sup-
plyof milk and milk products, and to investigate the
48Cf. DIcKINsoz, supra note 11.
"9The following statutes have authorized the creation of milk control boards:
Cal. Laws 1933, c. 1029, c. 384, c. 488; Conn. Acts 1933, c. 22634; Fla., Joint
Corn. Substitute for Senate Bill No. 786 (1933) ; N. J. Laws 1933, c. 169;
N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 226; Ohio, H. B. No. 671 (1933),; Ore. (S. B. 44)
(1933) ; Penna. Acts 1934, No. 37; Vt. H. B. No. 2 (1933) (H. 2); Wis.
Acts 1933, No. 235.
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undesirable practices of the industry," Already, studies
disclose deleterious price-cutting,"1 dumping, the de-
struction of milk, 2 the threat of unsanitary production,"
the aggrandizement of distributor's profits,". and the
impoverishment of the producers. 5  The regulation of
price, together with the enforcement of health stand-
ards, may afford the machinery for adjusting the con-
flicting interests of producer, distributor, consumer, and
society. These adjustments can be made only after
long and careful researches; and once made, they can
be maintained only by careful and continuous study.
The administrative board is the agency best adapted to
this work. Even its accomplishment will of necessity
be slow. To devise satisfactory standards for the de-
termination of fair price, the boards must consider the
related problems of production cost, transportation,
health regulation, competition, bargaining power and
consumer demand. The study and analysis of these
5 Some control boards concern themselves only with price regulation, i. e.,
The Vermont Milk Control Board does not attempt to dictate methods of
distribution. From correspondence.
51Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk Indus-
try, (N. Y., 1033).
52New York Times, July 28, 1933, at p. 2, col. 5; Sept. 20, 1933, at p. 15,
col. 2; Milk Dealer, Jan., 1933, p. 80.
5 3Report of the New York Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the
Milk Industry (1933), p. 14.
5 41n a recent Wisconsin study, it was found that while profits in other
industries have decreased, with but few exceptions, the profits of dairy dis-
tributors over this period were maintained at former levels. The distributors
which were investigated showed substantial profits during the depression
years. Some Facts Regarding Profits of the Distribution of Milk, Wiscon-
sin Department of Agriculture and Markets (1932), p. 3; see infra notes
86-88.
5SProducers' taxes were reported unpaid in the New York Investigation.
.Sopra note 53. p. 13. "The farmer is squeezed between a ridiculously low
price which he gets for his- milk and the high prices which are essential in
farm production." Wisconsin Department of Agriculture and Markets. Some
Facts Regarding Profits in the Distribution of Milk, p. 4 (1t32).
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economic incidents of price are essential for a workable
regulation of the industry. At present many of the
problems, to say nothing of their solutions, are un-
known. The mere clarification of these problems would
materially simplify the task of administration. Thus,
this fragmentary discussion of the problem of price is
intended to be merely illustrative of the extremely com-
plicated adjustment that is necessary, if any regulation
is to be successful. These problems may furnish some
evidence with which to answer the question put by
Green: Is the administrative factor so complicated that
it is unworkable?"
1. PRODUCTION COST
The regulation of price depends upon the determina-
tion of a legion of economic and social relationships, not
the least of which is production cost. Cost, however;
is elusive.. Milk production being in many cases only
one aspect of a farmer's productivity, the cost of milk
as a distinct unit must be considered in the light of the
associated activity of the farm." Thus, when examined
in its context, the cost of milk may be affected by the
profits derived from associated farm products." At some
periods of the year the herds may be maintained on the
by-products of crops grown for other purposes, at other
times they require purchased foods. Conversely, the
by-products of dairying have their own economic value
to the farm." Thus, the assumption that the cost of
56Green, Judge and Jury (1930), p. 77 et seq. See Mallon, infra note 80.57R. L. Cohen, A Survey of Milk Marketing Schemes and Price Policies.
University of Cambridge Department of Agriculture, Farm Economics Branch
Report, No. 20 (June, 1933), p. 58.
58Ibid, p. 15.
9I bid.
60 bid, p. 16.
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production plus a reasonable profit should determine
fair wholesale prices is misleading in that .it.hides the
complexity of cost determination. If price is to be
based upon production cost, should production cost be
based upon the costs of the marginal producer or the
costs of the more permanently established producer?6'
The answer to this question, of course, involves a policy
judgment concerning the desirability of centralizing
production with a few large-scale producers, or pro-
ducer-organizations, under strict regulation or produc-
tion uncontrolled by government regulation. A solu-
tion of the production cost problem is difficult so long
as the marginal producer exists, because a fair price to
the marginal producer returns excessive profits to the
more firmly established producers. But it is erroneous
to conclude that the marginal producers' cost deter-
mines selling price."
6 1Complications arise when one considers just who the marginal producer is
and what is marginal cost. When the price of milk falls, the efficient pro-
ducer may find it more profitable to divert his entire productive capital, labor,
and instruments into alternative lines which appear more attractive to him.
Even though he is equipped to produce milk at a profit, a certain price may
be reached which will not be conducive to a continuance of this business. At
any period of the season, the profit from crops and the slaughtering of cattle
may offer more inducement than milk production. In this sense of the word,
the most efficient' producer may be -considered a "marginal" guide, for the
price that the market offers him may determine whether or not he will
withdraw his supply from the market.
02This "profit" retrogression prevents the existence of a controlled uftit
standard of cost-profit relationship.
63A prevalent idea is that the price of milk should equal cost of production
plus a reasonable profit. As an appendage it is also 'said that the marginal
cost of production of a commodity will tend to determine the selling price.
But the reverse may be true, i. e., price determining marginal cost. Suppose
for example that P1, P2, and P3 are producing milk at $1.40, $1.50, and $1.60
per cwt., respectively, and that the current price of milk is $1.60. P3, the
"marginal" producer is selling at bare cost. It cannot be said, however, that
P3's cost determined price. Too many other factors ma have entered into
the situation. A decrease in demand by a variation in consumer's taste may
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The "formula method" of cost determination attempts
to segregate the dairy production costs from other farm
costs." The dairy cow as a unit of "standardized fac-
tory" is made the basis for estimating the proportionate
cost of labor, raw materials, and capital investment
involved in the production of milk. The artificiality of
this method is a sufficient criterion of its value.
Affecting production cost, either directly or indirectly,
competitive markets, 5 manufactured dairy products,"
make P2 the marginal producer. It will give manufacturers of milk products
an opportunity to produce substitutes for milk in skimmed, powdered, and
condensed form. These substitutes may be stored in seasons of plenty. When
prices rise, due to a curtailment of production, allowing P3 to resume activity,
these substitutes may be offered at a considerable reduction, forcing down the
price of fluid milk, and again eliminating P3 as the marginal producer.
64By estimating the costs of labor and raw materials in a hypothetical farm
situation, the cost of production is attempted to be derived. KING, THE
PRICE OF MILK (1920), p. 108. See also The Chicago Milk Inquiry, 26
JOURNAL POLITICAL ECONOMY, 321 (1918).
65Each market varies according to the season, weather, soil, standard of
living, etc. Accordingly there is no unanimity in selling price. An increase
or decrease of approximately one-half cent a quart is sufficient to draw milk
into one city and out of an area that has been furnishing other communities.
KING, THE PRICE OF MILK (1920), p. 102.
66
"The use of powdered milk will be a governor that may prevent abnor-
mally high prices in the scarce months to farmers in whole milk regions,
but it gives to farmers in other territories where milk may be cheaper, or to
summer producers, a relatively wider market for milk." Ibid, p. 101. There
is also as much competition between milk food products and other products.
The warfare between butter as a milk product, and oleomargarine, is a perti-
* nent' example. As the price of butter rises, consumption is transferred to
oleomargarine, decreasing the price of milk by increasing the available sup-
ply. The close relation between butter and fluid milk makes butter substitute
competition important to the milk industry, for "The value of fluid milk being
for a local or metropolitan market cannot be dissociated from its one and
only anchor, which is butter-fat, as a national or world commodity." From
correspondence. See also Tentative Draft for New York Area, Feb. 14,
1934, by Agricultural Adjustment Administration, p. 4.
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surplus, 7 variations in climate, 8 seasonY soil,"° nearness
to market,' standards of living,"2 and variations in bar-
gaining power"3 enter into the determination of fair cost-
price relationships. And in the determination of fair
cost of production, the effect of production cost upon
retail price cannot be disregarded. The establishment
of a production cost basis that will provide a "fair
standard of living" for the producer may so increase
the retail price of milk that it will force down the "fair
standard of living" of the consumer community. Ad-
justment of these conflicting interests is one of the
major responsibilities of milk control boards. To date
their determinations have been made without definite
standards. Indeed, what standards can be devised to
determine fair standards of living?
Temporarily, the necessity for immediate action has
6tBy surplus is meant the excess above the normal sale of whole milk.
An Economic Study of the Milwaukee Milk Market, Wisconsin Research
Bulletin 113 (1932), p. 18.
"Some areas through the advantage of desirable climatic conditions are
able to produce milk at lower costs, because of the abundance of good hay
and pasture. Likewise a relatively temperate summer climate is necessary
for the production of high quality dairy products.
69"For instance, the spring starts earlier and frosts somewhat later in the
Philadelphia district than in the New York district." KxNG, THE PrIcE OF
MILK, p. 94. While one market has an abundance of supply, another market
may suffer a shortage. The price in the latter market will doubtlessly be
influenced by the former.
"0The clay soil of northern Ohio or the rainy Seattle region is more suited
to dairying than the hills of Vermont.
7"Normally, producers must pay the transportation charges from the farm
to the country milk station. The cost will of course vary with the distance
to be covered. KING, supra note 69, p. 175; Wisconsin Research Bulletin 113,
Milwaukee Milk Market, p. 7.
"For instance, wages for farm laborers may vary according to the com-
munity standard of living, thereby enhancing production costs.
7"Poverty-stricken producers without available cash would naturally not be
in a position to bargain for low 'prices on implements and equipments that
make up their capital .structure.
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caused the substitution of public hearings for more
scientific computations of price. At present wholesale
and retail prices have been arrived at after argument
by representatives of producers, consumers, and dis-
tributors.7 This temporary expedient must be supple-
mented by independent investigation and research by
the administrative board if useful standards are to be
devised.
2. TRANSPORTATION
Transportation (i. e., collection and distribution) is
important in the determination of price. Distributors,
competing for larger markets have extravagantly dupli-
cated equipment at the expense of great capital invest-
ment." As the distributor naturally seeks a profit above
his operating expenses the burden of equipment must
be carried either by the producer or the consumer. Leg-
islative attempts to regulate the number of competitors
have not met with judicial approval. Indirectly, the
regulation of transportation cost as a price factor may
tend to reduce the number of competitors. This result
will be reached, however, only if the determination of
price is made upon the basis of "reasonable going con-
"Due to the necessity for immediate action, the technicalities of scientific
price computation has given way to public hearings, in which temporary sell-
ing prices are agreed upon after argument by representatives of producers,
consumers and distributors. Pa. Milk Control Board Bulletin, No. 1, Feb. 7,
1934.
75There are not only too many distributors and intermediate holding com-
panies, but each has more equipment than is needed in the business. It is
natural that each distributor demands a profit above his operating expenses.
ERDMAN, THE MARKETING OF WHOLE MILK (1921), p. 74.
The New York study revealed that about g0 per cent of the distributor's
spread, i. e., profit above selling price, is absorbed by operating costs. Supra
note '8, p. 53.
"
6New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U. S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 37 (1931).
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cern costs" and not upon the basis of "actual going
concern costs."" A business should not be able to capi-
talize its competitive indiscretions.
Allied to the problem of transportation is the problem
of "store," and "delivery-wagon" distribution. Early,
the Nebbia case focused attention upon the question of
parity between store and delivery wagon price. Some
storekeepers alleged that equality of price or a small
differential was injurious to their business, because of a
consumer preference for delivery service."8 Others
thought parity or even a slightly higher charge was
necessary because of the necessity of maintaining a
supply at all times."9 The chain stores, having developed
methods for reducing bottling and distributing costs,
have insisted upon lower rates for store sales. A dif-
ferential of one cent per quart, in favor of the store
sale, has been held to be equitable.' In the end the
determination of fair transportation costs will depend
77The determinating factor would then be the actual need of distributive
facilities, and not a reasonable profit above the facilities already existing.
Would this amount to arbitrary regulation, or taking without just compensa-
tion? "But 'just compensation' in condemnation cases means such conpensa-
tion as will leave the owner as well off economically as if there had been no
taking and this cannot be done if it be recognized, as the Nebbia case recog-
nizes, that there may be an evil of exorbitant exactions and that price fixing
is the appropriate remedy; for when the owner is deprived of the oppor-
tunity to obtain exorbitant profits, he is clearly less well off than before.
While the doctrine of the Nebbia case empowers a state to fix prices as a
remedy. for extortion, the fair value doctrine, if applied consistently with the
premises on which it is based, inhibits the exercise of that power the moment
it begins to be effective." Hale, The Constitution and the Price System, 34
COL. L. REv. 401, 425 (1934).
7SNebbia v. New York, supra note 2. * "At the present time the only oppos-
ing factor seems to be emanating from the chain store influence." From
correspondence. See also Milk Control Problems. Business Week, Aug. 26,
1933, p. 45.
TgErdman, supra note 75, p. 100.
80Supra note 78; see also, Mallon, The Cow Bolts the New Deal, Today,
May 5, 1934, p. 6.
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upon a policy-judgment concerning the place of com-
petition in the industry.
3. HEALTH REGULATIONS
The cost of compliance with health and sanitary
regulations is an important item in the determination
of price. Not only does the provision of refrigeration
equipment and adequate testing facilities add heavily
to the burden of production cost but the maintenance
of inspectors and the necessity of compliance with the
regulations of federal, state, local, and municipal stand-
ards add heavily to the burden. Under the present sys-
tem these costs are paid initially by the distributor and
are then either "routed back" to the producer by way
of reduced wholesale price, or else "passed on" to the
consumer in increased retail price. The function of the
administrative board will be to determine a fair distri-
bution of the burden.
4. COMPETITION AND BARGAINING POWER
As a price determinant, competition covers two
diverse problems of control: (1) the problem of over-
production, and (2) the problem of distributor com-
petition. Indeed, over-production and the resultant
price deterioration has been the impetus that has ini-
tiated most of the current milk legislation. "
Over-production, resulting in what is technically
known as, "surplus ' "" milk has been the depressing ele-
ment in the price structure. Large distributors, with
large variations in demands must carry large day-to-day
81Supra note 49.
S92Supra note 67.
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reserves for which they pay "fluid milk"'" prices. Smaller
distributors, escaping the burden of maintaining a large
reserve, consistently undersell the larger distributor.
To retaliate, the large producer because of the over sup-
ply of milk can insist upon a lower wholesale price. And
so the producer is made to bear the cost of the distri-
butor's competition.
The position of the distributor in the milk industry
assures him a position of dominance because of his
unique bargaining strength. His position is almost
identical with the position of the stockyard commission
man 84 and the grain elevator operator.85 The marketing
of stock cannot be long postponed if top prices are to be
obtained; marketing is done at stockyards miles dis-
tance from the source of production where railway car
or yardage fees prevent the producer from holding his
cattle for a favorable market; in short the producer
must take the price offered the day his stock arrives. In
the milk industry the perishable nature of the product,
and distance and distribution of the consumer prevent
economic power to fix the price that he will pay for
the producer from resisting the prices offered by the
distributor. Consequently, the distributor has the
fluid milk. Overproduction induced by marginal activ-
ity has increased the security of the distributor's posi-
tion," so that throughout the "depression" the distribu-
83By this term is meant the wholesale prices paid to the producer for milk
to be sold only for fluid consumption, as distinguished from milk going into
manufactured by-products, such as butter, condensed milk, etc., which com-
mands a lower price. Erdman, note 75, p. 194.
84Cf. Packers and Stockyards Act (1921), 42 Stat., at L. 159; 64 U. S. C.,
Title 7, §181; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397 (1922)
Minnesota v. Blasius, 54 Sup. Ct. 34 (1933).
8Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77 (1886).
98See Some Facts Regarding Profits of the Distribulion of Milk, Wiscon-
sin Department of Agriculture and Markets (1932), p. 3:
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tor has made substantial profits without a reduction in
operating expenses or capital investment." Further, the
producer has by reduced wholesale prices been required
to support the industry's luxury-the holding com-
pany.8 Unsatisfied to place the burden of excessive
capital structure upon the producer, distributors have
also required that producers purchase stock in distribu-
tor organizations ;8" and where the producers are organ-
ized the distributors have stepped in to control the
"On January 1, 1929, after the acquisition of a dairy company by the Borden
interests a new goodwill item of $2,411,578.89 was entered on the books. This
item represents 48 per cent of the total net worth as represented by common
stock of $5,000,000. In 1930 and 1931, dividends of 12% per cent and 10 per
cent were paid on this item as actual investment. The return "on actual invest-
ment was approximately double the dividend rate or between 20 per cent and
25 per cent."871n the Philadelphia milkshed there was a 4-cent per quart drop between
December, 1930, and January, 1933. Of this 4 cents the farmer was forced
to absorb 3.3 cents and the distributor .7 cents. Clement Harris, Battle of the
Milksheds, Current History, Nov., 1933, p. 197.
88
"One of the worst features connected with the history of the dairy com-
panies during the past few years is the result of mergers and consolidations
which have been taking place in the dairy industry. It was argued in 1929
and 1930 when these mergers and consolidations occurred -that they would
effect economies with benefits to producers and consumers. The actual facts
as revealed by the department's investigations show clearly that those who
really were benefited were the operators and the stockholders." Further, "it
appears also that while the combined incomes of operators, officers, executives
and stockholders of other industries have been declining, the combined salaries
and- incomes of operators, officers, executives and stockholders of the dairy
distributing companies have been definitely on the increase during the years
1929, 1930, and 1931. Thus, in spite of .the fact that general business condi-
tions have been consistently getting worse and that milk prices for these
years have been among the lowest on record, the dairy companies found it
possible to maintain profits and receive increased incomes." Wisconsin De-
partment of Agriculture and Markets, supra note 55. See also Report of the
Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk Industry, New York
(1933), at pp. 20-22.
In regard to the Chicago agreement which was abrogated by Secretary of
Agriculture Wallace, he said: ". . . to our knowledge the profits of some
milk companies, including subsidiaries of big holding companies, are exorbi-
tant, to say the least. It is scarcely the function of a government depart-
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policy of producer organizations." Against these prac-
tices, the producer is relatively helpless for the deteri-
oration of milk and the necessity for its rapid distribu-
tion leaves him in a position of disadvantage. And at.
least during this period of overproduction the distribu-
tor's threat of procuring milk from other production
areas keeps the producer subservient, if not compla-
cent.
The consumer, unprotected by price regulation; -is
unable to insist upon a fair retail price. At the present
time, however, he has seldom been heard to object, hav-
ing been too readily satisfied with minute reductions in
the retail price made possible by the distributor's
domination of production. It is not to be anticipated
that any material benefit will be permanently passed on
to the consumer. Although at present the consumer is
profiting from the distributor's domination of the indus-
try, if minimum price regulation is fixed at a point which
will pemit the large distributor to force out his smaller
competitors, then without maximum price regulation
the consumer is bound to suffer. Thus the distributor
holds the key position in the milk industry.
CONCLUSION
A consideration of the various plans for regulation
must be preceded by an inarticulate evaluation of the
distributor. Is elimination or regulation his fate?
Though the issue i' naturally controversial, a prevailing
ment devoted to the interests of agriculture to scatter its resources in efforts
to enforce exorbitant profits to some milk companies." Christian Century,
Jan. 3, 1934, pp. 8, 9.
"Disclosed by field study, investigation, and correspondence.
9 Alexander, Kendrick, The Milk Trust Gets the Cream. The Nation, Vol.
138, p. 155 (February 7, 1934).
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notion is that the distributor-middleman is, at the most,
an unnecessary evil-that he blocks the path between
producer and consumer and exacts a burdensome toll.
Those who are opposed to his complete extinction have
suggested that producers organize into units for con-
trol of distribution91-thereby eliminating the excessive
cost of the middleman's profit. Likewise, the erection
of producer-controlled plants for the manufacture of
milk products has been suggested as a means of com-
bating the "surplus" milk evil." More probable seems
the absorption of the production industry by the dis-
tributors."Granting that regulation and not elimination is the
fate of the distributor, administrative boards must
devise means of controlling the relations between dis-
tributor and producer. There must be experimentation
with licensing and certificates of convenience and
necessity." Zoning may afford protection against dup-
lication of effort and excessive competition." The
9 5Erdman, supra note 75, p. 243.
921bid, p. 67; Wisconsin Research Bulletin, No. 113, An Economic Study of
the Milwaukee Milk Market (1932), p. 44.
93Alexander Kendrick, supra note 90.
94 Proposed in Philadelphia, Business Week, Aug. 26, 1933, p. 45. Compare
the attempt at licensing control of the ice business by issuance of certificates
of necessity. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman. 285 U. S. 262. 52 Sup. Ct. 371
(1931). Although no certificates of necessity are required by the Iowa agree-
ment under the Federal Agricultural Adjustment Act, yet some restriction is
imposed upon distributors in regard to taking on new producers without the
sanction of the market administrator. U. S. Dept. of Agriculture. Press
Service, p. 2. February 10, 1934.
Official order No. 6, June 29, 1933, p. 2, issued by the State Board of Milk
Control of New Jersey, has attempted to control production by allowing full
payment to producers only as to quantities paralleling the amount prior to
June, 1933. Production above this limit must be purchased at lower prices.
See also, Wheeler McMillen. Milk as a Public Utility. Country Home, Feb-
ruary, 1934, in respect to control of supply in Winnipeg. Canada.
9 5Erdman, suepra note 75, p. 243.
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processing tax may be effective, if policy favors the
maintenance of the marginal producer in seasons of
oversupply." In order to stimulate productivity in win-
ter seasons, Philadelphia using the "base-surplus" 7
plan, has fixed the producer's "base" according to his
production record in the past winter months.
Already there has been some experience with these
controls in the industry. These were early attempts
to establish the distribution side of the industry on a
monopoly basis.9 " Federal milk commissions9 have
existed since 1917. Although they have not had the
power to fix prices, through arbitration, they have
given some stability to the industry.'0 Now, under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act,"0 ' the Secretary of Agri-
96Proposed by the Secretary of Agriculture under the Federal Agricultural
Adjustment Act.
97"To correct oversupply producers will work on a 'base' production scheme,
-built on the fact that cows, left to mature, give more milk in spring than in
the fall. The succeeding shrinkage late in the summer and during the fall
is helped by the changing diet from green pasture to dry hay. By stagger-
ing the breed, it is possible to shift the period of greatest milk production
from spring to fall. The Philadelphia plan rewards farmers for making
such changes. The base price equals the price paid for the total amount of
milk produced during the fall period and any surplus beyond that takes a
lower figure. A farmer whose herd produces 1,000 quarts a day during
October, November, and December, and 4,000 during May and June, will
receive the base price for 1,000 quarts and a lower figure for the surplus."
Business Week, Aug. 26, 1933, p. 45.
08Recommendation of the Wicks Committee in New York in 1916, and of
the Governor's Tri-State Milk Commission in Pennsylvania in 1917.
99R.eport of the Federal Trade Commission on Milk and Milk Products,
1914-1918 (June 6, 1921), p. 129.
100Ibid, p. 113.
10148 Stat. 31; U. S. C. A. (Special Pamphlet No. 4, July. 1933). See
also the tentative draft of the agreement for the New York Metropolitan
area released to the New York Milk Control Board on January 25, by the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration. p. 1: "that said interstate commerce
portion cannot be effectively regulated or licensed without that portion which
is intrastate commerce."
The Oregon MIk Control Statute also authorizes conformity with a view
to securing a uniform system of regulation. Supra note 49.
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culture is empowered to regulate the interstate aspects
of the industry. The regulations by state milk commis-
sions or control boards have generally been effective
and satisfactory to the industry."2 Municipalization of
the distribution and control of supply has already been
attempted along the same lines as electricity, water,
gas, etc."3 Regulation of price and competition has been
provided in some states through boards of health refus-
•ing to inspect "foreign" milk, thus preserving the integ-
rity of the home market.0 ' Conversely, health standards
have been lowered when serious shortages exist.0 5
Whatever the source or method of control, it is desir-
able that there should be no conflict in administration.
An initial step in this direction has been taken by Cali-
fornia, who abides solely by the standards prescribed
by the Secretary of Agriculture under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act. Whenever possible, co-operation be-
tween state and federal authority will enhance the effec-
tiveness of regulation.
The complexities of the producer-distributor-con-
'°
2Information obtained from letters from Milk Control Boards. In New
York, however, an attempt to make the Milk Control Bill permanent has been
made by the distributors, against the protests of the producers who complain
of unfair treatment and dominance of the distributors. New York Times,
March 24, 1934, at p. 8, col. 2.103Proposed for Milwaukee, 1914. See Erdman, supra note 75, p. 243. In
Winnipeg, Canada, the Public Utility Board not only controls the price of
milk to producers, distributors, and consumers but also controls supply. It is
interesting to note that this same board controls, among other things, power,
water, light, traction, and municipal finance. See Wheeler McMillan, supra
note 94.
104Due to the paucity of other administrative devices, Boards of Health
have been cleverly used as a unit to raise the price of milk. Health authori-
ties in some localities have bluntly refused to inspect milk from adjacent
territories that are sold at lower prices. Ruth L. Cohen, A Survey of Milk
Marketing Schemes and Price Policies (1933), University of Cambridge,
Department of Agriculture, Rcport No. 20; Mallon, supra note 80.
105Erdman, supra note 75, p. 26.
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sumer relationship may defy all attempts at systematic
regulation. But if governmental control is workable at
all, it can only succeed through the intelligent and scien-
tific planning of administrative boards and commissions.
:This administrative regulation of the milk industry
should seek to create (1) a quality product at a fair
price'to the consumer, and (2) a sustained and adequate
purchasing power within the tri-partite relation which
will support an economic structure capable of absorbing
the products of the industry."6
1OSee Tugwell, in Today, April 21, 1934.
